Background. The firs phase of national surveillance for avian influenz (H5N1) human disease in Thailand occurred over a 4-month period that began on 1 December 2003. Subsequently, a nationally coordinated laboratory system (NCLS) for avian influenz (H5N1) was created to assess population-based surveillance, specimen procurement, case detection, and reporting at the national level.
The public health threat of avian influenz A (H5N1) transmission among poultry and from birds to humans has prompted global preparedness plans for this disease [1, 2] . Although human-to-human transmission of avian influenz A (H5N1) has not yet been efficient the theoretical risk exists and is compounded by recent isolation of a strain with potential for human-to-human transmission [3] [4] [5] . Key preparedness strategies include designated interdisciplinary planning committees, committee liaisons to external health entities, linkages with regional emergency preparedness groups, written pandemic influenz protocols, and plans for facility access, occupational health, mass distributions of vaccine and antiviral agents, and surge capacity. The development of new rapid diagnostic techniques for avian influenz A (H5N1) have emerged [6, 7] ; however, limited data are available for optimizing inclusion of these tests in laboratory-based avian influenz A (H5N1) surveillance.
In Thailand, the firs wave of the human avian influenz A (H5N1) pandemic began on 1 December 2003, when the firs human case of H5N1 was detected by the Ministry of Public Health, and lasted 4 months Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cid/article-abstract/46/9/1394/329106 by guest on 02 March 2019 [8] . A rapid surge in clinical specimens (blood, nasopharyngeal, and throat swab specimens) submitted to the Thai National Institute of Health (NIH) for H5N1 testing prompted the Thai NIH to establish the National Coordinating Laboratory System (NCLS) over a 6-week period. The mission of the NCLS was to standardize and improve administrative and laboratorybased efforts to screen respiratory specimens, optimize laboratory case detection, and report results. We conducted a preand postintervention study of the Thai NLCS for key laboratory-based surveillance, quality assurance, and outcome parameters for avian influenz (H5N1) preparedness.
METHODS
Preintervention interval. Nationwide surveillance to detect influenz A (H5N1) was initiated on 1 December 2003, after outbreaks of sudden death in poultry were reported in central Thailand [8] . Surveillance focused on all medical encounters for putative pneumonia or influenza-lik illness with self-report of exposure to ill or dead poultry [8] . Patients at risk of infection were reported through the provincial public health offic to (1) the regional disease prevention and control centers and (2) the Bureau of Epidemiology at the Ministry of Public Health. Throat and nasopharyngeal (NP) swab specimens or aspirate specimens were sent for viral culture to the Thai NIH of the Department of Medical Sciences. Initial screening, if possible, was performed as point-of-care rapid tests for H5N1 (SD Bioline Influenz Antigen A/B [MT Promedt Consulting] and QuickVue Influenz A+B test [Quidel] ) at the referring hospitals and/or clinics. All specimens were confi med for the presence of H5N1 by viral culture. Field-based investigation occurred for all suspected and confi med cases of avian influ enza (H5N1) via face-to-face interviews by staff members from the provincial health offic to assess putative exposures and the household environments.
The NCLS Program Design (1 April-15 May 2004). The Ministry of Public Health assembled an NCLS organizing committee composed of 5 scientists, 3 physicians, 2 technicians, 7 health care-affiliate personnel, and 4 epidemiologists. The committee firs convened with the objectives of optimized specimen collection and accountable reporting of results (figu e 1). The committee met weekly-if not every other day-over the 6-week interval and identifie the 5 following core NCLS program components: (1) 1 national, centralized laboratory; (2) trained, dedicated personnel; (3) H5N1 laboratory surveillance of throat and NP specimens using RT-PCR, real-time RT-PCR, and viral culture; (4) laboratory reporting algorithms; and (5) a national, secured Web site to provide education regarding proper clinical specimen collection and for reporting the results [9] . The goals for the centralized laboratory were to improve processing of a high volume of clinical specimens, streamline specimen collection and transportation, evaluate rapid and con- [10] . The committee determined that serum specimens, if collected, would be stored but would not be a routine component of the surveillance program because of the real-time limitations for collection and testing of acute-and convalescent-phase paired serum specimens.
Preliminary evaluation of the rapid influenz A test after the firs wave of the Thai H5N1 outbreak suggested low sensitivity (28%) [11] . This test performance prompted the Thai NIH to implement molecular diagnostic techniques to facilitate early diagnoses of avian influenz (H5N1). All influenz A clinical respiratory specimens (throat and NP swab specimens or aspirate specimens) positive for subtypes H1, H3, and H5 by specifi PCR primers were further tested using RT-PCR and real-time RT-PCR primers specifi to H5N1 (figu e 1) [8, [12] [13] [14] . Viral isolation was also performed using standard methods [15] . Throat and NP specimens were considered to be positive for avian influenz virus if the viral culture result was positive and was confi med by immunofluo escent antibody with H5-specifi monoclonal antibody (provided by the World Health Organization), if epithelial cells in clinical specimens were immunofluo escent antibody positive for H5, or if the RT-PCR (RT-PCR or real-time RT-PCR; using H5-specifi primers) result was positive. A specimen was negative for avian influenz virus if the results of immunofluo escent antibody, RT-PCR or real-time RT-PCR, and viral isolation (second passage) were negative. If specimens were positive by RT-PCR and real-time RT-PCR and subsequently negative by viral culture, additional viral sequence analyses were performed for the specimen. If viral sequencing identifie H5, the specimen was determined to be H5N1 positive.
Surveillance and case definitions data collection, and measurement of outcomes. Patients with confi med cases of H5N1 were define as patients with laboratory evidence of influenz A (H5N1) infection [8] . Patients with suspected cases were define as patients with severe pneumonia or an influenza like illness, reported exposure to ill or dead poultry, and laboratory evidence of influenz A not confi med as H5N1 [8, 16] . Excluded patients were those reported through the system who did not meet the definition for patients with confi med or suspected cases, including those with infections caused by influenz A H1 or H3 or other laboratory-confi med pneumonia pathogens. Data collection included demographic and clinical data, specimen quality (e.g., inappropriate obtainment, incorrect containers, and total specimen shipment duration), number of specimens submitted per patient, sensitivity and specificit of the rapid test and RT-PCR, total laboratory turnaround time, specimen processing time, and estimated annual cost for program establishment (e.g., training personnel, establishing computer programs and the computerized network, computers, administration fees, and conference expenses), and maintenance of the NCLS program (e.g., salaries, logistics and equipment, fiel investigations for specimen obtainment, Web site maintenance, administration fees, and conference expenses). The outcomes measured included the quality, accuracy, and time from specimen obtainment to availability of the fina report. The measurements of specimen quality were evaluated externally and internally. The external evaluation included assessment of specimens by type, containment, and adequacy for further testing. The internal evaluation included assessment of the quality of the specimens with use of the human b-actin gene [17] . The sensitivity and specificit of the rapid tests were compared with the those of viral culture (the gold standard). Time-motion studies were measured at the 3 following points: (1) period from specimen obtainment to arrival at the central laboratory (pretest period), (2) period from specimen arrival to completion of testing (testing period), and (3) period after completion of testing to availability of the fina report in the computer-based reporting system (posttest period
was considered to be statistically significant Cost es-P ! .05 timates were based on a conversion value, with 35 bahts being equivalent to US$1.
RESULTS

Pre-NCLS phase.
During the initial 4-month phase of national surveillance for human avian influenz (H5N1), 915 throat and NP specimens from 610 patients (range, 1-3 specimens per patient) were submitted (table 1). The epidemiological investigation is reported elsewhere [8] . Among 580 patients with suspected avian influenz (H5N1) and 30 with probable avian influenz (H5N1), 12 (2%) had H5N1 infection confi med by RT-PCR, real-time RT-PCR, and/or viral culture. All 12 patients with confi med cases had positive results of culture for avian influenz (H5N1). Seven (58%) of these 12 patients had both NP rapid tests and viral culture performed, and 2 (28.5%) of these 7 patients had positive NP rapid test results.
Post-NCLS phase. After the establishment of the NCLS, 11,042 specimens from 4417 patients were submitted for avian influenz (H5N1) testing during the 31-month period (table  1) . Thirteen patients (0.3%) had H5N1 infection confi med by RT-PCR, real-time RT-PCR, and/or viral culture. All 13 patients with confi med cases had positive avian influenz (H5N1) viral culture results; no temporal or geospatial cluster patterns were noted in the epidemiological investigations of the confi med and suspected cases. Ten (77%) of the 13 patients with confi med H5N1 infection had specimens submitted for both NP rapid tests and viral culture, and 3 (23%) of these patients had positive H5N1 NP rapid test results. Of note, 1 patient with H5N1 infection received a neuraminidase inhibitor 148 h before specimen collection and had a negative rapid NP test result.
Program evaluation of rapid tests and NCLS quality indicators. The sensitivity and specificit of combined RT-PCR and real-time RT-PCR testing of the respiratory specimens for avian influenz (H5N1) were 100% and 99.8%, respectively (table 2) During the pre-and postintervention periods, 777 (85%) of 915 and 10,434 (95%) of 11,042 clinical specimens, respectively, were adequate for confi matory testing ( ), P ! .001 the median time from specimen collection to results decreased from 17 days (range, 14-24 days) to 1.8 days (range, 0.25-4 days;
), and the duration of specimen shipment de-P ! .001 creased from 46.5 h to 21.1 h ( ). The total laboratory P ! .001 turnaround time was 1.8 days (range, 0.25-7 days). The laboratory turnaround time was 0.4 days (range, 0.25-1 days) during the pretest period, 1.2 days (range, 0.6-5 days) during the testing period, and 0.2 days (range, 0.1-0.8 days) during the posttest period. The estimated total annual cost for establishment of the NCLS was $17,113 (training personnel accounted for $4285, establishing computer programs and computerized networks cost $4300, computers cost $5715, and administrative fees and conference expenses accounted for $2813), with an estimated annual maintenance cost of $14,256 (salaries accounted for $5850, logistics and equipment cost $2850, fiel investigations for specimen collection cost $2070, Web site maintenance accounted for $1550, and administrative fees and conference expenses accounted for $1936). The perceived benefit of laboratory-based surveillance, compared with the traditional epidemiological surveillance methods and resources, included reduction in community-based assessments, improved specimen collection, and optimized administrative and laboratory algorithms.
DISCUSSION
The development and implementation of the Thai NCLS for avian influenz (H5N1) provides a model program of laboratory-based surveillance, case detection, and expedited reporting of human disease. This program can be readily adopted or modifie to resource-adequate and resource-limited settings to enhance avian influenz (H5N1) global preparedness plans. Initially, this program was created after a high rate of poultry deaths prompted a national surveillance effort for human disease that identifie avian influenz (H5N1) in 5 adults and 7 children [8] . Notably, the study linked human disease to direct contact with sick poultry, young age, pneumonia, lymphopenia, and rapid progression to respiratory failure [8] and was followed by several clinical investigations of avian influenz (H5N1) in Southeast Asia [3-5, 11, 16, 18-21] .
The design and implementation of the NCLS program now characterizes the foundation of a systematic, efficient and rel- atively cost-efficien program. Notably, 12 confi med cases were identifie during the 121-day pre-NCLS period (99 cases per 1000 days), compared with 13 confi med cases identifie during the 959-day post-NCLS period (13.6 cases per 1000 days). Mortality among patients with confi med cases was similar for both periods (67% and 69%, respectively) (table 1). Contributions to the significan decrease in case detection during the post-NCLS period likely reflec a multitude of interventions within and beyond the NCLS program. Inherent in the NCLS design, expanded surveillance, case detection, medical education, and public awareness have integrated roles, providing an invaluable infrastructure if a human avian influenz (H5N1) pandemic was to emerge. All countries involved in such a pandemic would need to rapidly engage such a program, with coordinated mass screening and case containment as critical components of global avian influenz (H5N1) preparedness.
As with all studies, recognized limitations to the assessment of the NCLS program exist. First, laboratory surveillance for human avian influenz (H5N1) was restricted to throat and NP swab specimens and tracheal aspirate specimens. Blood specimens, although sometimes submitted, were not prospectively evaluated because of the limitations of serologic testing of paired acute-and convalescent-phase specimens. There are no current data to suggest that case detection has been underestimated by the laboratory-based algorithms. Second, routine use of the rapid tests at the point-of-care visit remained inconsistent across the country, exemplifying the continued need for ongoing field-base education and use of the national Web site to optimize appropriate specimen collection. Third, we have limited data on the empirical and preemptive use of antiviral therapy and the potential impact of such practices on specimen collection and on the use of diagnostic tests. A noted trend has been for physicians to prescribe antiviral therapy to the index patient before specimens are obtained [11] .
From the laboratory perspective, rapid diagnostic tests for influenz A and avian influenz (H5N1) have technical limitations [11, 22, 23] . In general, these limitations include variation in rapid diagnostic test sensitivity, specimen collection techniques, and consistent containment and transportation of specimens. Furthermore, several reports also suggested the low sensitivity of rapid influenz tests to detect H5N1 [5, 11, 22] . Therefore, the use of molecular techniques with short turnaround times can facilitate early diagnosis [24] , proper management and early control strategies [21] , and expanded surveillance. In addition, obtainment of multiple specimens per patient was used as an NCLS strategy to enhance case detection. Three major modification to enhance NCLS program capacity have occurred since program inception. First, an expert review panel was created to monitor core administrative and laboratory-based policies and changes over time. Second, 50 surveillance and rapid response team trainees were hired to promote public awareness of human and avian influenz (H5N1), assess appropriate specimen collection, and have readily accessible skills in outbreak investigations and epidemiological assessments. Lastly, 4 additional mobile laboratory units opened during 2006-2007 to maintain high-volume surveillance. Although the NCLS surveillance definitio of a probable case has low specificit , the laboratory algorithm and programmatic goals remain focused on extensive national surveillance and early case detection. The estimated costs for the maintenance of the NCLS program are $14,256 annually. Because Thailand is a middle-income country where the overall estimated costs are inexpensive, compared with those in developed countries, our estimated annual costs for establishment and maintenance of the NCLS program may not be generalizable to other developed nations.
Current efforts are being directed toward integrating the NCLS with a geographic information system to help monitor and distinguish avian influenz A (H5N1) rates among poultry and humans. It is anticipated that such a system will aid geospatial and temporal tracking of human and animal disease, permit modeling of disease transmission and real-time surveillance, and serve as a resource for other emerging infectious diseases. In conclusion, the NCLS program in Thailand plays an integrated role in Southeast Asian avian influenz (H5N1) pandemic preparedness. Despite recognized program limitations, the relative costs and benefit associated with this program justify national surveillance in this middle-income country. This system offers flexibilit for capacity building and application to both infectious and noninfectious preparedness and serves as a model for avian influenz laboratory-based preparedness.
